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Reflections on Metaphysical 
Explanation 
Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson 
The nature of metaphysical explanation is a question that should be 
constantly on every metaphysician’s mind, and yet it is rare to see 
explicit statements about the methodological approach that writers 
take. We tend to just enter the flow of ideas and words in a particular 
‘discourse’ and see where it leads us. It is easier that way but can lead 
us astray. I can’t claim to be a role-model in this respect. I have of-
fered a comment here, a remark there, but plenty room for improve-
ment. However, I have come across quite a few confusions that can 
be traced to failed understanding of method/approach, and one or 
two really interesting statements of method. Here I share one such 
confusion about method, and one interesting view about method. 
1. A confusion about Hobbes 
The necessity of causal connections is usually associated with causal 
realism. Say, Aristotle’s claim that “whenever the potential active 
and potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious 
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to the potentiality, the former must necessarily act and the latter 
must of necessity be affected” (Metaphysics: Bk. 9, §5). For Aristotle, 
this is not the result of an a priori argument outlining a logical/con-
ceptual necessity, but a consequence of a certain view of material 
reality; objects with powers interact to provoke changes in each 
other. I have always supposed that this was the view Hume targeted 
(Treatise: Bk. I, Part 3). 
However, in Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous discussion of causal 
necessity, we see Hobbes being represented as Hume’s target and as 
someone who ‘evidently’ sees causal necessity as a “logical connec-
tion of some sort” (Anscombe 1971: 89). To be sure, Hobbes does 
incriminate himself in the following passage:  
[…] an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the 
agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; 
which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be under-
stood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any 
one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect 
is not produced (Hobbes 1656: Ch. X, §3)  
However, I think Anscombe is wrong to infer from Hobbes’ use of 
the phrase ‘cannot be understood’ that he is developing a purely log-
ical argument, at least not of the a priori kind. 
Hobbes’ epistemology is empiricist, albeit with clear rationalist 
overtones. He thinks the senses provide us with empirical knowledge 
about the powers of material bodies, and thus knowledge of causes, 
because powers are causes (Hobbes 1656: Ch. I, §4). From our em-
pirical knowledge of these causes we can then rationally calculate the 
effects they produce, and, vice versa, the causes from the effects. In 
light of this, I think it would be more charitable to interpret Hobbes 
as making claims about what can/cannot be thought, given the na-
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ture of the external world as it is empirically known to us (or as-
sumed). This could offer a basis for a deductively valid argument, 
yes, but using premises with material (non-logical) content which is 
empirically true; hence the conclusion is a posteriori of experience. If 
we find fault with his claims about what can or cannot be under-
stood, we should find fault with his empirical knowledge and not 
with his logic. 
Consider the same reasoning in the early 18th century, from some-
one with knowledge of Newton’s Principia. That person could argue 
like Hobbes that—if Newtonian mechanics is accepted as a true de-
scription of the world—it cannot be understood, on pain of contra-
dicting Newton’s mechanics, but that if an object is acted upon by 
an external force it will change its state of motion in proportion to 
the force applied. It is a logically valid argument, but moving from 
premises based on empirical research, and so the conclusion is a pos-
teriori. The approach suits a naturalist approach to metaphysical ex-
planation.  
Indeed, Naomi Thompson (2019) outlines something very simi-
lar. On her view, metaphysical explanations are subject to epistemic 
constraints imposed by the context in which a question is asked; they 
are not explanations of what must be the case without regards to any 
concerns except what can or cannot be conceptualised.  
Hume may well have had Hobbes in mind. But he didn’t just 
attack his logic. Hume first had to deny Hobbes’ premise that the 
senses give us knowledge of the nature of external objects, and thus 
turned the question of causation into a mere conceivability issue; 
one unrestrained by epistemic concerns (Treatise: Bk. I, Part 3).  
Now, it is difficult to assess today in what way exactly it can have 
mattered that Anscombe misrepresented Hobbes’ position. But we 
can tell that it did matter. 
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2. McTaggart’s approach to metaphysics 
McTaggart’s The Nature of Existence (1921/1927), is well known for 
containing McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. It is less 
well known for containing a long and very interesting elaboration of 
metaphysical method. Indeed, he devotes the whole of chapter 3, 
‘Method’, to an elucidation of his approach. Contemporary readers 
may be even more surprised to find out that we can find something 
useful about metaphysical explanation in the writing of a self-con-
fessed Hegelian idealist.  
It is important to note that McTaggart is an idealist in two differ-
ent ways. First, he is an idealist with respect to the method of meta-
physics; a methodological idealist. He thinks we can only gain 
knowledge about the ultimate structure of reality—which is the aim 
of metaphysics—through an examination of the general content of 
our ideas; not through a study of the content of our experiences of 
particular matters of fact. Empirical observations are inadequate to 
the task because they are particular both with regard to the qualities 
observed and the identity of the entities observed, while the ultimate 
structure of reality will have to be perfectly general. We might be 
able to infer by abstraction from a number of particular observations 
that they have some general feature in common, but this would fail 
to show that this general feature belongs to more than just the lim-
ited sample we have observed. Instead, McTaggart believes (we may 
be tempted to downgrade this to hopes) that the rational mind is able 
to directly ‘grasp’ the general nature of the fundamental features of 
reality via rational reflection of the ideas we have about them. In 
other words, his preferred method of finding out about the ultimate 
structure of reality is by introspective reflection on the general con-
tent of our minds.  
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Today it is popular to ridicule idealism as a silly idea from the 
past, but in actuality much of contemporary metaphysics cannot re-
ally be distinguished from idealism. Whenever anyone focuses solely 
on the conceptual connections between ideas in their philosophy, 
which is the essence of a priori philosophical reasoning, they are do-
ing pretty much what the idealists thought philosophy is all about. 
Indeed, anyone who thinks that the theories and findings of empir-
ical science is irrelevant to metaphysics because it can only tell us 
about the actual world—just one manifestation of all the possible 
worlds allowed by the ultimate structure of reality—are applying a 
method I find difficult to distinguish from McTaggart’s.   
Second, McTaggart is an idealist with respect to the nature of re-
ality; an ontological idealist. This is perhaps the aspects of idealism 
that tends to be ridiculed. He thinks he can show that reality cannot 
fundamentally be material, and that therefore reality must instead 
consist of spiritual substance (ideas). His argument for this conclu-
sion is pretty much identical to Berkeley’s, notably that we are mis-
takenly inferring from the fact that we are acquainted with phenom-
enal properties in experience, that there must be something non-
phenomenal that is causing the experience. Now, we may not want 
to accept this argument as proof of the conclusion that there is no 
material reality outside the mind. But, I think we should pay atten-
tion to the importance McTaggart bestows on subjective experience, 
as a way to judge the success of metaphysical theories. I think it holds 
good for idealists and material realists alike. 
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3. Taking experience seriously  
According to McTaggart, the way things appear to be in experience 
does not give us knowledge about what things are really like. Even 
an idealist can distinguish what ideal reality appears to be like and 
what it is really like. He nevertheless thinks that the content of our 
experience provides an important criterion for the success of meta-
physical theories. A metaphysical theory need not portray reality as 
it appears to be in experience. Indeed, such a theory is often trying 
to say what things are really like, as opposed to what they appear to 
be like. However, since the content of experience constitutes a rare 
type of certain and indubitable knowledge—what Russell called 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’, notably of our own inner states—
every adequate metaphysical theory must be able to explain how the 
experiences we actually have can arise. If it says the world is not as it 
appears to be, it must be able to explain how it can appear to be 
otherwise  
To calm the jitters of hardcore realists, let’s be clear about the 
limits of knowledge by acquaintance. It is a form of knowledge that 
doesn’t extend beyond the content of the experience itself. My ex-
perience of an apple on a table indubitably constitutes knowledge of 
the state of my mind, notably that I am having an experience of that 
kind. But, it does not constitute knowledge of whether there is in 
reality an apple on the table. However, since the former is indubita-
ble knowledge, our account of reality must take into account the fact 
that reality contains my experience of an apple on a table.  
McTaggart’s idea, roughly, is that any theory about what things 
are really like can be tested by asking whether it offers a conceptual 
model of reality that explains why things actually appear to us in the 
way that they do. The model need not resemble the appearance, but 
if it differs from the appearance it must explain what it is about the 
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world that allows it to appear so different from what it really is. As 
long as the model cannot explain the characteristics of experience, 
the facts of experience constitute an anomaly for the theory. On the 
other hand, when we have a model that claims the world is different 
from experience, yet is able to explain how it can appear in the way 
that it does, the appearance becomes a phenomenon bene fundatum; 
a well-founded datum of experience (McTaggart 1927: §494).  
I think we can observe that many of the core disputes in meta-
physics revolve around the question of how well theories explain ex-
perience. For instance, presentism is meant to have the upper hand 
on eternalism in explaining why we only ever experience the present. 
Not just because presentism says the world is pretty much as it ap-
pears to be, but more because eternalism cannot adequately explain 
how we can have a continuous experience of successive states and of 
ourselves as continuously remaining in the present, when in fact 
nothing exists continuously through time or moves from one time 
to another. For all its other faults, McTaggart’s philosophy has one 
piece of good advice; take experience seriously as a criterion of suc-
cess for metaphysical explanations. 
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